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Abstract
We examine the implication of executive gender on asset prices. Using a large
sample of US public firms during 2006–2015, we find a negative association between
female CFOs and future stock price crash risk. However, the impact of female CEOs
on crash risk is not statistically significant. The results support the notion that
CFOs play a stronger role than CEOs in curbing bad news hoarding activities be-
cause CFOs’ primary duties are financial reporting and planning. Our findings are
robust to several econometric specifications controlling for potential endogeneity and
to alternative measures of crash risk. At last, we show that the negative relation be-
tween female CFOs and future stock price crash risk is more pronounced among firms
with weaker corporate governance, less market competition, lower analyst coverage,
and higher financial leverage. Collectively, our evidence highlights the importance of
CFO gender for firm financial decision making and stock return tail risk.
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Of 323.1 million people counted in the US 2016 Census, around 50.8% were women.
But when it comes to the C-level jobs at Fortune 500 companies, only one woman climbed
to the top of the corporate ladder as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 1998 and 30 women
held Chief Financial Officer (CFO) positions in 2000. There has been a steady but slow
improvement of executive gender diversity over the past 20 years. In 2015, 24 female CEOs
and 58 CFOs served at Fortune 500 companies.1 With the rise of female top executives in
corporate America, recent studies have documented a material impact of executive gender
on corporate decision making. For example, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that firms
with male top executives engage in more acquisitions and have more debt issuances than
those with female executives. Faccio et al. (2016) show that firms managed by female
CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher survival rate than those
managed by male CEOs. Furthermore, Barua et al. (2010) and Francis et al. (2015) report
that the appointments of female CFOs improve accruals quality and increase the degree
of accounting conservatism. The purpose of this paper is to extend this line of inquiry
from corporate activities to stock prices. In particular, we examine whether top executive
gender and underlying innate behavioral traits have an impact on future stock price crash
risk.
Earlier sociology, cognitive psychology, and behavioral economics studies indicate
that there exist several behavioral differences between men and women. First, women
have a higher risk aversion than men in terms of their gambling habits and investment
portfolio risk profiles (e.g., Levin et al., 1988; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Sundén and
Surette, 1998; Agnew et al., 2003; Brooks et al., 2017). Second, women are less overcon-
fident and optimistic than men when it comes to driving ability, exam answer confidence,
stock trading, and the choice of compensation scheme (e.g., Svenson, 1981; Feingold, 1994;
Lundeberg et al., 1994; Barber and Odean, 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Third,
1Data source: S&P Capital IQ.
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women have a better compliance with taxation rules, business ethics, financial reporting
guidelines, financial market regulations, and professional financial advice than men (e.g.,
Baldry, 1987; Barnett et al., 1994; Bernardi and Arnold, 1997; Fallan, 1999; Ittonen et al.,
2013; Brooks et al., 2017). Graham et al. (2013) find that corporate financial policies are
influenced by top executives’ behavioral traits. Therefore, when the gender differences
documented in the previous studies exist among well-educated top executives, firms run
by female executives may adopt different firm policies from those run by male executives.
In turn, it is naturally to ask whether firm stock prices are influenced by executive gender.
We focus on the firm-specific stock price crash risk that captures the left tail risk of stock
returns. Tail risk, the third moment of stock returns, has come under the spotlight after
the 2008 financial crisis. Both institutional and individual investors care about crash risk,
because a sudden dramatic decline of stock prices can impose significant losses on their
portfolios.2
The literature on crash risk suggests that managerial bad news hoarding activities
increase firms’ future stock price crash risk. Due to a variety of managerial incentives,
such as career and compensation concerns, firm managers have an incentive to withhold
bad news from outside investors for an extended period (e.g., Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton
et al., 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). However, when bad news stockpiled within the firm
reaches a tipping point, the costs of hoarding bad news will exceed the benefits of doing
so (Baik et al., 2011). Once bad news gets revealed all together in the market, investors
will immediately revise their expectations about firm growth prospects, leading to a stock
price crash. Consistent with the bad news hoarding conjecture, empirical evidence sug-
gests that financial opacity (Hutton et al., 2009), tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2011b), and
CFOs’ compensation incentives and overconfidence (Kim et al., 2011a, 2016) are positively
associated with future stock price crash risk, while institutional investor stability (Callen
and Fang, 2013), mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption
2The loss on paper may lead to the real wealth loss when investors have to cut their losses during
extreme negative events.
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(DeFond et al., 2015), religiosity at the county level (Callen and Fang, 2015), and CEO
age (Andreou et al., 2016) are negatively associated with future stock price crash risk.
We expect female executives to affect crash risk through two channels. First, most
gender studies support the view that women are more risk averse and less optimistic than
men. Firms with female executives are less likely to invest in risky projects in the beginning,
which may lead to bad operating performance. Also, since female executives are less
overconfident compared with their male counterparts, they are more likely to terminate
money-losing projects at an early stage. By avoiding risky investment and terminating
early failures, firms run by female executives are less likely to have bad news in the first
place. Second, since female executives are more likely to comply with financial market
regulations and report high-quality financial information than male executives, firms run
by female executives are less likely to withhold bad news intentionally when bad news
actually arrives. Collectively, we conjecture a negative empirical relation between female
top executives and firm stock price crash risk.
In our empirical analysis, we separately examine CEO and CFO gender because
these two top executives may affect crash risk through different mechanisms. CEOs are
firms’ highest-ranking executives and their primary responsibilities include making major
corporate decisions, managing the overall operations and resources of a company, and acting
as the communication bridge between the board of directors and corporate operations.
CEOs may affect crash risk primarily through managerial risk taking that leads to bad
firm performance. CFOs are the senior executives responsible for managing the financial
actions of a company. The CFO’s primary duties include financial reporting, tracking cash
flow and financial planning, as well as analyzing the company’s financial strengths and
weaknesses. Jiang et al. (2010) find that accrual management and earnings surprise are
more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to those of the CEO. Kim et al. (2011a)
further show that CFO equity incentives are strongly associated with higher firm crash
risk, while the relation between CEO equity incentives and crash risk is much weaker.
Anecdotal evidence, such as Enron (2001), Worldcom (2002), Lehman Brothers (2010),
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and Autonomy Corporation (2012), also indicates that CFOs are likely to be involved in
a series of accounting scandals. Given that CFOs retain the ultimate responsibility for
reporting firm financial performance (Mian, 2001), female CFOs may influence crash risk
primarily through mitigating the bad news hoarding activities. It remains an empirical
question whether CFO gender may have a stronger impact on crash risk than CEO gender.
We investigate the empirical link between executive gender and crash risk using a
sample of S&P 1500 companies from 2006–2015. Following previous studies, we adopt
three measures of crash risk: a stock price crash week indicator, the negative skewness of
firm-specific weekly returns, and the asymmetric volatility of negative and positive stock
returns (e.g., Kim et al., 2011b; Callen and Fang, 2015). In our baseline regressions, we find
no empirical evidence that CEO gender is related to future stock price crash risk. However,
our results show that firms with female CFOs have a significantly lower one-year-ahead
stock price crash risk than those with male CFOs, after controlling for other predictors of
future stock price crash risk. The coefficient estimate of our main variable of interest in
the baseline model suggests that a firm with a female CFO has a 2.9% lower likelihood of
experiencing a stock price crash than a comparable firm with a male CFO. The impact of
CFO gender on crash risk is economically meaningful given that the sample mean value of
unconditional probability of stock price crash is 25.4%. The empirical link between female
CFOs and crash risk remains statistically significant when we include both CEO and CFO
gender in our regressions.
An identification challenge for us is to address the potential endogeneity in our empir-
ical analysis. Firms with female executives or male executives may differ in unobservable
firm characteristics. Therefore, directly comparing future crash risk between firms with
female or male executives may simply capture the effect of the unobservable firm differ-
ences instead of the effect of executive gender. Furthermore, executive candidates and
corporate boards may mutually select each other in the labor market, which raises a pos-
sibility that female executive candidates choose to work for firms with ex ante low crash
risk. We use three econometric identification strategies to mitigate the potential endogene-
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ity due to the omitted variables and the reverse causality. First, we employ a propensity
score matching (PSM) approach to identify control firms with male executives, which are
otherwise indistinguishable by the observed firm characteristics from our treatment firms
with female executives. Second, we adopt a high-dimensional fixed effects model to control
for unobservable firm characteristics. Finally, we apply a difference-in-differences research
design and investigate the impact of male-to-female executive transition on the changes in
future stock price crash risk, compared with the impact of male-to-male executive tran-
sition. Overall, our three identification tests suggest that the negative relation between
CFO gender and crash risk remains statistically significant after addressing the endogeneity
concern.
We further conduct a battery of supplementary analyses. First, we implement sub-
sample analyses and find that the empirical relation between CFO gender and crash risk
is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, lower product market
competition, higher information asymmetry, and larger ex ante firm risk (leverage). Second,
our results are robust after controlling for the compensation incentive, age, and tenure of
CFOs, CEO pay slice, and board gender diversity. Third, we show that moderating firm
earning manipulation is one possible channel through which female CFOs reduce firm
future stock price crash risk. Fourth, we provide the evidence that overconfidence is more
important than risk aversion in terms of explaining the empirical relation between CFO
gender and crash risk. Fifth, we find that the impact of CFO gender on crash risk is weak
when CEOs are the chairman of firm boards. Sixth, we adopt alternative measures of crash
risk in the previous studies and still find a negative relation between female CFOs and
these measures. In summary, our findings consistently demonstrate the importance of the
influence a specific manager has on corporate decision making and reveal how managerial
characteristics such as gender may interact with corporate monitoring mechanisms.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this study is the first to examine the implication of executive gender on stock return
6
distributions at the firm level.3 Previous gender studies examining the relation between
gender diversity and firm performance usually focus on firms’ financial performance mea-
sured by either Tobin’s Q or return on assets. Adams and Ferreira (2009) study the role of
female directors and find that the average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is
negative. However, Hoogendoorn et al. (2013) show evidence in their field experiment that
teams with an equal composition of male and female members achieve a better performance
than those dominated by male members in terms of sales and profits. Our crash risk mea-
sures directly capture the tail risk in actual stock return distributions, which has become
a key component of corporate and portfolio risk management. It is important to notice
that we focus on the third moment of stock returns, not the first moment average returns
or the second moment return volatilities. Given the behavioral differences between female
and male executives, we believe that the presence of female executives has an ambiguous
effect on firm stock performance.4 In addition, Gul et al. (2011) have already provided ev-
idence that board gender diversity improves the informativeness of stock prices, measured
by idiosyncratic volatilities.
Our study also adds to the emerging literature on the different roles of CEOs and
CFOs in corporate operations. Both Jiang (2010) and Kim et al. (2011a) examine the
compensation incentives of CEOs and CFOs and find that CFO compensation incentives
are more strongly related to earning management and bad news hoarding activities than
CEO compensation incentives. Our evidence corroborates the findings in these two studies.
Furthermore, recent literature has documented the important role of CFOs in the corporate
decision making process. For example, Barua et al. (2010) show that firms with female
CFOs have a better accrual quality than those with male CFOs. Ge et al. (2011) document
a systematic association between CFO styles and corporate accounting choices. Francis
et al. (2015) find that the switch from male to female CFOs is associated with a significant
3Previous studies have examined the relation between fund manager gender and portfolio returns.
However, these studies mainly focus on the impact of fund manager gender on portfolio construction and
management.
4Stock price crash risk may only be one of the factors which a firm considers when hiring a female
executive.
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increase in firms’ accounting conservatism. We contribute to these studies by establishing
an empirical link between CFO gender and firm stock price crash risk. Consistent with
the contention that CFOs have an important role in financial reporting, we show that it is
CFO gender, rather than CEO gender, which influences future stock price crash risk.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on stock price crash risk by showing that
female CFOs mitigate the likelihood of firms experiencing stock price crashes due to bad
news hoarding activities. Recent studies find that managerial bad news hoarding decisions
are related to corporate financial opacity (Hutton et al., 2009), CFO option sensitivity (Kim
et al., 2011a), tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2011b), institutional investor stability (Callen and
Fang, 2013), corporate social responsibility (Kim et al., 2014), religious beliefs at the US
county level (Callen and Fang, 2015), mandatory IFRS adoption (DeFond et al., 2015),
CEO age and overconfidence (Andreou et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2016), and accounting
conservatism (Kim and Zhang, 2016). Unlike these factors documented in the previous
studies, gender is an individual’s innate nature which does not change over time. The
behavioral traits based on gender are different from those based on social norms such as
religion (Callen and Fang, 2015). Our paper provides novel evidence that female CFOs are
less likely to engage in bad news hoarding activities which lead to stock price crashes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3, presents our empirical
predictions. Section 3 discusses the data collection, key variable definitions, and descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents main results of the empirical relation between executive gender
and firm future stock price crash risk. Section 5 provides supplementary test results and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical predictions
In neoclassical economics, managers are homogeneous and make the same rational
decisions on the basis of the same information set. However, recent upper echelons theory
suggests that managers act on the basis of their personalized interpretations of information
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and these personalized construals are a function of individual-specific attributes such as
experiences, disposition, compensation incentive, and gender (e.g., Hambrick and Mason,
1984; Hambrick, 2007). Consistent with upper echelons theory, recent studies of corporate
activities provide evidence that executive gender has an impact on corporate outcomes such
as financial reporting (Barua et al., 2010; Francis et al., 2015), bank loan contracts (Francis
et al., 2013), risk taking activities (Huang and Kisgen, 2013), and efficiency of capital
allocation (Faccio et al., 2016). Based on these studies, it is worthwhile to empirically
examine whether executive gender may inherently influence firm stock returns because
stock prices should reflect any impact of executive gender on corporate outcomes in an
efficient market.
In the crash risk literature, managerial bad news hoarding activities are the primary
cause of stock price crashes. When corporate governance mechanisms fail to alleviate
managerial compensation related agency problems (e.g. Jin and Myers, 2006; Kim et al.,
2011a; Andreou et al., 2016), executives may choose to hide bad news until it is necessary
to disclose it to the public. Additional determinants of stock price crashes, which can be
ascribed to executives, include accrual manipulation (Hutton et al., 2009), overconfidence
(Kim et al., 2016), and accounting conservatism (Kim and Zhang, 2016). Previous gender
studies have acknowledged that in general, women are more risk averse, less overconfident,
and better compliant than men. If these gender differences in the general population still
exist among top executives, then female executives are more conservative when making
investment decisions, more likely to terminate early failure projects timely, and more likely
to follow accounting rules and supply transparent financial information. Nevertheless,
Adams and Funk (2012) use a large survey of directors and show that the gender differences
among directors are different from those in the general population. For example, female
directors are more risk loving than male directors. Although the relationship between
executive gender and stock price crash risk remains an open empirical question, we predict
that, ceteris paribus, the incremental effect of female executives should be to reduce future
stock price crash risk.
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We further note that CFOs could be more influential than CEOs in the corporate
financial decision making process. CFOs are mainly responsible for disclosing financial
information, choosing appropriate accounting measures, and assuring financial statement
quality. Instead, CEOs are mainly responsible for firm investment, expansion, and devel-
opment. Consistent with this view, recent studies find that CFO compensation incentives
have a stronger impact on floating-to-fixed rate debt structure (Chava and Purnanandam,
2007), earnings management (Jiang et al., 2010), debt maturity structure and earnings
smoothing decisions (Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), and crash risk (Kim et al., 2011a)
than CEO compensation incentives. Given that stock price crashes are mainly due to
managerial bad news hoarding, we expect CFO gender to play a stronger role than CEO
gender in mitigating future stock price risk.
An alternative possibility is that CFOs may become involved in bad news hoarding
activities because of pressure from CEOs. Friedman (2014) develops a theoretical model
and shows that powerful CEOs may compromise the independence of CFOs. A survey
study by Matejka (2007) indicates that CEOs may exert pressure on CFOs regarding their
financial reporting decisions because CEOs can influence the decisions of corporate boards
related to CFOs’ compensation package and promotion opportunities. Feng et al. (2011)
also provide archival evidence that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations
because they succumb to pressure from powerful CEOs. Powerful CEOs may influence
corporate organizational structure so that CFOs may not have an opportunity to report
directly to the board. Previous studies support the view that powerful CEOs can exert their
will and influence corporate decisions, including those related to CFOs (e.g., Finkelstein,
1992; Adams et al., 2005). Therefore, we acknowledge the possibility that powerful CEOs
may have an impact on the empirical relation between CFO gender and future crash risk,
and provide empirical evidence for this prediction.
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3. Sample, variables, and summary statistics
3.1. Sample selection and data sources
Our sample starts with firm–year observations for which executive gender informa-
tion is available on the ExecuComp database.5 The ExecuComp database provides de-
tailed biographical and compensation information on executives, such as their gender, age,
and tenure. We identify firm CEOs and CFOs by using data items “CEOANN” and
“CFOANN” in the ExecuComp database. Our period of study on executive gender is
2006–2015, because the data item “CFOANN” is only available from 2006 and our stock
price crash risk measures are calculated up to the end of 2016. We then delete observa-
tions with missing Compustat accounting data and missing Centre for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) stock price data. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009;
Kim et al., 2011a), we further exclude firm–years with non-positive book values and total
assets, low fiscal-year-end stock prices (less than $1), and fewer than 26 weekly stock return
observations. To control for potential outliers, we follow Kim et al. (2016) and exclude
firm–year observations that fall in the top and bottom percentiles of leverage, return on
asset, market value of equity, and market-to-book ratio. After applying these data se-
lection filters, our CFO sample consists of 12,745 firm–year observations for 3,408 unique
CFO–firm combinations, and our CEO sample consists of 13,018 firm–year observations
for 3,006 unique CEO–firm combinations.
In our empirical tests, we collect financial analyst data from the Institutional Brokers’
Estimate System (I/B/E/S), institutional ownership data from the Thompson Reuters in-
stitutional holdings’ database, institutional investor type classification from Brian Bushee’s
website, managerial entrenchment and director-level data from the Institutional Share-
holder Services (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics) database, Fama–French industry returns from
Kenneth R. French’s website, and earnings restatement data from AuditAnalytics.
5The ExecuComp database covers most public companies in the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 index,
including the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indexes.
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3.2. Dependent variables: Firm-specific crash risk
To investigate the effect of executive gender on future stock price crash risk, we first
construct three firm-specific measures of (ex post) stock price crash risk for each firm–
year observation following the prior crash risk literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hutton
et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a,b): (1) Crash, an indicator variable for firms experiencing at
least one stock price crash week during a fiscal year; (2) Ncskew, the negative conditional
skewness of firm-specific weekly returns during one fiscal year; (3) Duvol, the down-to-up
volatility of firm-specific weekly returns during one fiscal year.
We estimate firm-specific residual weekly returns from the following extended market
index model regression over fiscal year T :
rj,t = αj + β1,jrm,t−2 + β2,jrm,t−1 + β3,jrm,t + β4,jrm,t+1 + β5,jrm,t+1 + εj,t (1)
where rj,t is the return of stock j in week t and rm,t is the return of the CRSP value-weighted
market index in week t. We supplement the standard market index model with the two
lead and lag terms to correct for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979). This regression
separates a firm’s return into the one correlated with the stock market movement and the
one due to the firm-specific shock (εj,t). For firm j in week t, its firm-specific weekly return
is defined as Wj,t = ln(1 + εj,t). The natural logarithm transformation reduces the positive
skewness in the stock return distribution and improves the symmetry of Wj,t.
Our first measure of firm-specific crash risk is Crashj,T , an indicator variable that
equals one for a firm–year experiencing one or more firm-specific crash weeks during fiscal
year T , and zero otherwise. Following Hutton et al. (2009), we identify crash weeks in
fiscal year T for firm j as those weeks during which the firm-specific weekly return Wj,t is
3.09 standard deviations (0.1% frequency in the normal distribution6) below the average
firm-specific weekly returns over fiscal year T . Crashj,T captures the likelihood of a firm’s
6If firm-specific weekly returns are normally distributed, the likelihood of a crash during a fiscal year
would be 1− (1− 0.1%)52 = 5.07%.
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stock price crash in a given fiscal year.
The second measure of firm-specific crash risk is Ncskewj,T , the negative coefficient of
skewness of firm-specific weekly returns. Following Chen et al. (2001), Kim et al. (2011a),
and Kim et al. (2011b), we calculate Ncskewj,T as the negative third central moment of
Wj,t divided by the cubed standard deviation of Wj,t. Specifically, Ncskewj,T is defined as:
Ncskewj,T = −















where nj,T is the number of available firm-specific weekly returns for firm j during fiscal
year T . Scaling the raw third central moment by the normalization factor, the cubed
standard deviation in the denominator – allows for comparison across firm-specific returns
with different variance. The first minus sign in Equation (2) ensures that an increase in
Ncskewj,T corresponds to firm j having a higher stock price crash risk in fiscal year T , i.e.,
a more negative-skewed return distribution.
The third measure of firm-specific crash risk is Duvolj,T , the ratio of down-side volatil-
ity to up-side volatility. Following Chen et al. (2001), Kim et al. (2011a), and Kim et al.















where nu,j,T (nd,j,T ) is the number of up (down) weeks for firm j’s stock during fiscal year
T . For each stock j over fiscal year T , we define the up (down) weeks as those when the
firm-specific weekly returns are above (below) its annual mean. Intuitively, Duvolj,T is the
natural logarithm ratio of the standard deviations of Wj,t on down weeks to the standard
deviations of Wj,t on up weeks. Similar to the convention of Ncskewj,T , an increase in
Duvolj,T corresponds to firm j having a higher stock price crash risk in fiscal year T
We forward these three measures by one year in our main analyses, so that our
dependent variables refer to the one-year-ahead future stock price crash risk: CrashT+1,
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NcskewT+1, and DuvolT+1.
3.3. Independent variables of interest and control variables
Our primary independent variables of interest are executive gender indicator vari-
ables: FemaleCEOj,T and FemaleCFOj,T , which equal one if firm j’s corresponding
executive is female in fiscal year T , and zero otherwise. Following Jiang et al. (2010),
we identify an executive to be a CEO (CFO) if ExecuComp’s data item “CEOANN”
(“CFOANN”) is equal to “CEO” (“CFO”).
Following the earlier crash risk literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Hutton et al.,
2009; Kim et al., 2011a, 2016), we control for the following variables in our main analyses.
DturnT is the detrended stock trading volume, which is a proxy for the heterogeneity of
investor opinions. Chen et al. (2001) find that firms with high intensity of the differences
of opinions among investors are more likely to experience stock price crashes. NcskewT
is the prior stock price crash risk. SigmaT is the volatility of firm-specific weekly stock
returns. ReturnT is the mean of firm-specific weekly stock returns. We include these three
variables to control for the potential persistence of the third moment, second moment,
and first moment of stock returns, respectively. Chen et al. (2001) also find that firms
with a higher past stock return mean and volatility are more likely to crash in the future.
SizeT is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. MtbT is the market-to-book ratio.
LeverageT is the ratio of long-term debts to total assets. RoaT is the return on assets. We
follow Kim et al. (2011a) and control for these four observable firm characteristics. AccmT
is the three-year moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals, which is a
proxy for financial reporting opacity. Hutton et al. (2009) document a positive relation
between financial reporting opacity and future stock price crash risk. Finally, we follow
Fang et al. (2009) and Callen and Fang (2015), and control for LitigationriskT , which
indicates industries with a high litigation risk. To account for the variations of executive
gender across different industries and over time, we control for Fama–French 48 industry
(Fama and French, 1997) and year fixed effects in all our regressions. Detailed definitions
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of all variables are described in Appendix A.
3.4. Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical anal-
ysis. The sample period for our three crash risk measures is 2007–2016, while the sample
period for the rest of the variables is 2006–2015. The mean values (standard deviations)
of Crash, Ncskew, and Duvol are 0.254 (0.435), 0.098 (0.866), and 0.004 (0.380), respec-
tively. The means and standard deviations of our crash risk measures are comparable to
those reported in the studies focusing on the ExecuComp samples (e.g., Kim et al., 2011a,
2016; Andreou et al., 2016). Of 12, 745 firm–year observations in our CFO sample, 3, 237
(25.4%) firm–years experience at least one crash. The mean values of FemaleCEO and
FemaleCFO are 0.034 and 0.089, suggesting that firms on average appoint more female
CFOs than CEOs. In a given year, our sample has on average 44 firms with female CEOs
and 113 firms with female CFOs. The ratios of female executives in our sample are similar
to those reported in Bugeja et al. (2012) and Francis et al. (2013). The distribution of the
other variables is broadly consistent with those reported in earlier studies.7
4. Main empirical analysis results
In this section, we examine the impact of executive gender on firm future stock price
crash risk.
4.1. Baseline panel regression model
First, we test how the presence of female executives affects firm future stock price
crash risk after controlling for other potential determinants of crash risk. Our baseline
7For brevity, we only report the summary statistics of these variables in our CFO sample.
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panel model is as follows:
Crash riskj,T+1 = β0 + β1Executive genderj,T + γ
′Control variablesj,T + θi + µT + εj,T (4)
where Crash riskT+1 is measured by one of CrashT+1, NcskewT+1, or DuvolT+1. We
follow previous crash risk studies and use logit regressions when the dependent variable
is CrashT+1
8 and OLS regressions when the dependent variables are NcskewT+1 and
DuvolT+1. All regressions control for Fama–French 48 industry (θi) (Fama and French,
1997) and year (µT ) fixed effects. Robust z-values and t-values are corrected for clustering
the regression residuals at the firm and year levels (Petersen, 2009).
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 2 show that in the sample of firm–years with CFO gen-
der information, the estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are negative and statistically
significant. The results indicate that firms with female CFOs experience a lower one-year-
ahead firm-specific crash risk than those with male CFOs. Columns (4)–(5) of Table 2
present the regression results in the sample of firm–years with CEO gender information.
The estimated coefficients of FemaleCEOT are not statistically significant at the 10%
level, suggesting that CEOs’ gender is not related to future firm-specific crash risk. Fi-
nally, we include both FemaleCFOT and FemaleCEOT in Equation (4) and report the
results in columns (7)–(9) of Table 2. In line with the results reported in columns (1)–(6),
we find that only female CFOs are associated with lower future crash risk, and the coef-
ficient of CEO gender remains statistically insignificant across all three measures of crash
risk. In untabulated tests, we add an interaction variable FemaleCEOT × FemaleCFOT
in columns (7)–(9). We find that the coefficients of the interaction variable are not statisti-
cally significant, suggesting that the impact of female CFOs on crash risk is not conditional
on CEO gender.9 The estimated coefficients of our control variables are generally compa-
rable with previous studies. Future stock price crash risk is higher for firms with greater
8The inclusion of year fixed effects in logit regressions may lead to the incidental parameter problem.
Our results are robust to using linear probability models.
9In our sample, there are 63 firm–year observations with both female CFOs and CEOs.
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prior stock price crash risk (NcskewT ), stock return volatility (SigmaT ), firm size (SizeT ),
operating performance (RoaT ), and accrual manipulation (AccmT ).
To further examine the economic significance of our results in columns (1)–(3), we
follow the intuition in Hutton et al. (2009) and Callen and Fang (2015).10 We first re-
estimate the marginal effect of FemaleCFOT on CrashT+1 in the logit regression. The
marginal effect of FemaleCFOT is −2.9%: that is, a firm with a female CFO has a 2.9%
lower probability of crash than a comparable firm with a male CFO. Given the sample
mean value of unconditional probability of crash to be 25.4%, the drop in stock price crash
risk in any year corresponding to a female CFO is 11.4% of the sample mean. Regarding
the economic significance of NcskewT+1 and DuvolT+1, a female CFO will lead to a 58%
(= 0.057/0.098) decrease in Ncskew at the mean and 575% (= 0.023/0.004) decrease in
Duvol at the mean.11 Thus, the effect of CFO gender on future stock price crash risk is
both statistically and economically significant.
4.2. Endogeneity
Our analysis so far indicates that female CFOs are associated with lower future stock
price crash risk, while the relation between CEO gender and crash risk is statistically
insignificant. Nevertheless, we recognize that female executives may not be randomly
assigned to firms, therefore the potential endogeneity of executive gender makes it ques-
tionable to establish an empirical causal relation between executive gender and crash risk.
The endogeneity concern may arise due to unobservable heterogeneity when unob-
servable firm characteristics can affect both executive gender and crash risk. Corporate
boards and female executive candidates may mutually select each other in the labor mar-
ket. On the one hand corporate boards may favor candidates with a certain type of gender
10Hutton et al. (2009) and Callen and Fang (2015) set their continuous independent variables of interest
to the 25th to the 75th percentiles and hold all other control variables at the mean. Next, they estimate
the drop in a crash risk measure relative to its sample mean, corresponding to a shift of the independent
variables of interest from the 25th to the 75th percentiles.
11The magnitude and the economic significance of FemaleCFOT ’s coefficients are comparable to those
reported in Kim et al. (2016) that also uses indicator variables as the explanatory variable of interest.
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in the executive nomination process, but on the other hand female executive candidates
may be attracted to firms with certain female-friendly characteristics. The factors which
affect the mutual selection between corporate boards and female candidates could be as-
sociated with the results documented in Table 2. In addition, reverse causality could be
an alternative explanation of our results. Female executive representation is not uniformly
distributed across all firms covered by the ExecuComp database. Female executive candi-
dates may simply apply for jobs in firms with less crash risk. Huang and Kisgen (2013)
argue that because of the “overcrowding” effect of male candidates in the executive job
market (Bergmann, 1974), we may observe more female executives in consumer products
related firms. It is possible that the industries favoring female executive candidates are
naturally less crash prone than the other industries. Although we mitigate the reverse
causality issue by using current executive gender to predict future stock price crash risk
and by controlling for industry fixed effects, the concern of simultaneity may still remain
if executive gender is persistent over time.
In the remainder of this section, we adopt three econometric approaches to mitigate
the potential endogeneity concern: (1) a propensity score matching (PSM) approach, (2)
a higher-order fixed effects model, and (3) a difference-in-differences framework.12
4.2.1. Propensity score matching
If the difference in crash risk between firms with female executives and those with male
executives depends on the firm characteristics affecting whether or not female executives
are hired, then the negative relation between female CFOs and crash risk is not due to
CFO gender per se. When we directly compare crash risk between firms with female
and male executives in Table 2, the estimated regression coefficients may be biased due
to potential confounding variables. To mitigate this estimation bias, we employ a PSM
procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and estimate the treatment effect of executive
gender on firm crash risk. For firms with female executives (treatment group), we identify
12As we have discussed in the following, these three methodologies are not free of possible limitations.
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a group of control firms with male executives (control group) that exhibit no observable
differences in firm characteristics. When we compare the treatment sample to the control
sample, executive gender is the only distinguishable firm characteristic. PSM helps us to
address the non-random mutual selection concern and improves the causal inference in our
empirical analysis.
We first estimate a probit model to calculate the probability (i.e., the propensity
score) that a firm with a set of firm-level characteristics is run by a female CFO. Columns
(1) and (3) of Panel A of Table 3 report the coefficients estimated by the probit model.
The covariates which we use to predict the propensity scores are the control variables in
Table 2. Column (1) indicates that comparing to firms with male CFOs, those with female
CFOs are associated with larger firm size, a lower market-to-book ratio, lower leverage,
higher return-on-asset, lower accrual management, and higher litigation risk. Column (3)
shows that comparing to firms with male CEOs, those with female CEOs are associated
with a higher market-to-book ratio, lower return-on-asset, lower accrual management, and
lower litigation risk.
To ensure that firms in the treatment sample and control sample are comparable, we
adopt the nearest neighbor matching approach and require that the maximum difference
between the propensity score of a firm with a female executive and that of the matched
firm does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. Each firm with a female CFO (CEO) is
matched to a firm with a male CFO (CEO) and with the closest propensity score. We
conduct two diagnostic tests to verify that firms in the treatment and control groups have
the similar observable characteristics. First, we re-estimate the probit model for the post-
match sample and report the results in columns (2) and (4) of Panel A of Table 3. All
the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant, indicating that firms between the
treatment and control groups do not have distinguishable firm characteristics. In addition,
the estimated coefficients in columns (2) and (4) have much smaller absolute value than the
corresponding estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (3), suggesting that the decrease
in the statistical significance is not just due to the drop in the sample size. The pseudo
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R-square in the CFO (CEO) sample falls from 0.037 (0.095) for the pre-match sample
to 0.010 (0.017) for the post-match sample. Second, we directly compare observable firm
characteristics between the treatment and control groups. Panel B of Table 3 show that all
the univariate difference test statistics are statistically insignificant. These two diagnostic
tests suggest that the difference in crash risk between the treatment and control groups is
only due to executive gender, not other observable firm characteristics.
Finally, we compare our three measures of stock price crash risk between firms in
the treatment and control groups, and report the average treatment effects estimated by
PSM in Panel C of Table 3. Consistent with our main findings, we find that firms with
female CFOs are associated with significantly lower crash risk than those with male CFOs.
However, there are no significant differences in crash risk between firms with female CEOs
and those with male CEOs.
4.2.2. High-dimensional fixed effects
One weakness of our PSM analyses is that we only control for observed firm character-
istics. If the correlation between executive gender and crash risk is affected by unobservable
firm characteristics that can not be accounted for in our PSM procedure, then any hidden
bias due to latent variables may still remain after matching. Gormley and Matsa (2014)
recommend implementing a fixed effects model to mitigate the potential endogeneity con-
cern due to unobserved heterogeneity across firms and time-varying heterogeneity across
industries. We follow their advice and control for the firm and interacted industry-year
fixed effects in Equation 4, our baseline panel model.
In column (1) of Table 4, we re-estimate the empirical association between CrashT+1
and FemaleCFOT by controlling for firm and year fixed effects.
13 In columns (2) and (3) of
Table 4, we re-estimate the OLS regressions for NcskewT+1 and DuvolT+1 and control for
unobserved time invariable firm characteristics and time varying industry effects (firm and
year × Fama–French 48 industry dummies). Consistent with the results reported in Table
13Gormley and Matsa (2014) develop a computer memory-saving procedure to estimate high-dimensional
fixed effects model. However their method is not compatible with the probit model.
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2, the estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level across three measures of crash risk. For comparison, we also employ
the high-dimensional fixed effects analyses in our CEO sample and report the results in
columns (4)–(6) of Table 4. The relation between female CEOs and crash risk still remains
statistically insignificant. Our main results are robust after controlling for unobserved firm
characteristics.
4.2.3. Difference-in-differences
Our third identification method is to employ a difference-in-differences framework
around the appointments of female executives to identify the effect of such executives
on future stock price crash risk. We follow Huang and Kisgen (2013) and compare firm
stock price crash risk before and after transitions from a male to female executive with
a control sample of firms undergoing male-to-male executive transitions. The difference-
in-differences approach compares firms’ future crash risk for two similar groups with and
without the appointment of female executives but would otherwise be subject to similar
influence from executive turnovers. Therefore, any difference in the changes in future
crash risk before and after the appointment of female executives is more likely due to the
impact of female executives rather than the difference between the two groups prior to the
appointment of female executives.
Over our sample period of 2006–2015, we first identify firm–year observations in
which a firm experiences either a male-to-male or male-to-female executive transition. We
require that a new executive keep his/her position for at least three consecutive years. The
transition year T is defined as the first year when the new executive comes into power.
Then we construct our difference-in-differences test sample as firm–year observations three
years before and three years after an executive transition, excluding the transition year
T . To be included in the sample, firms must have available accounting data in Compustat
for at least two years before the transition year T . Our final CFO (CEO) difference-in-
differences sample contains 637 (581) cases of male-to-male transitions and 99 (44) cases
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of male-to-female transitions.14 Our difference-in-differences regression model is:
Crash riskj,T+1 =β0 + β1CFOPostj,T+1 + β2CFOTransitionj × CFOPostj,T+1+
γ′Control variablesj,T + µT + θi + εj,T
(5)
where CFOTransitionj is an indicator variable that equals one if firm j’s transition year
T is a male-to-female transition and zero if firm j’s transition year T is a male-to-male
transition, CFOPostj,T+1 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm–year T + 1 is
after the CFO transition and zero otherwise. Consistent with Huang and Kisgen (2013),
we control for firm (θi) and year (µT ) fixed effects in Equation (5).
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Our difference-in-differences test has several advantages. First, we require a new ex-
ecutive to be in power for at least three years so that he/she has enough time to influence
firm activities. Second, our sample covers multiple firm–years before and after the executive
transitions, which offers us a balanced comparison and removes the potential noise in the
year of executive transition. Last, our test design reduces time invariant unobservable firm
effects by taking male-to-female transition firms as the treatment sample and male-to-male
transition firms as the control sample. In other words, if the reduction of crash risk around
the executive transition can be alternatively explained by a latent firm characteristic vari-
able, it not only must have coincidentally changed over the transition but also be unrelated
to the transition itself. Columns (1)–(3) of Table 5 present the results of our difference-in-
differences tests for the CFO gender transition sample. The estimated coefficients of the
product term CFOTransitionj × CFOPostj,T+1 are negative and statistically significant
across three measures of crash risk, indicating that female CFOs reduce firms’ future stock
price crash risk at a significantly higher rate than male CFOs. We repeat our difference-
in-differences tests in the CEO gender transition sample by replacing CFOPostj,T+1 with
CEOPostj,T+1 in Equation (5). The test results are reported in columns (4)–(6) of Table 5.
14Due to the small number of female-to-male and female-to-female transitions in our sample, we can not
examine the impact of a female-to-male transition on crash risk.
15After controlling for the firm fixed effects, it is not necessary to include CFOTransitionj separately
in Equation (5) (Huang and Kisgen, 2013).
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The estimated coefficients of the product term CEOTransitionj ×CEOPostj,T+1 are not
statistically significant, suggesting that male-to-female CEO transition is not associated
with the decrease in future crash risk.
One concern on this difference-in-difference approach is that some executive turnovers
in our sample are not exogenous. For example, if a firm plans to change its corporate
policies correlating to a lower level of crash risk, it may strategically hire a certain type
of new executives. Therefore, the results of our difference-in-differences analysis may not
establish the causal relationship between female CFOs and reduced crash risk. To mitigate
this concern, we drop executive turnovers that are likely to be endogenous and restrict our
difference-in-differences analysis to a subset of executive turnovers that are less likely to
be related to firms’ intention of reducing crash risk.16
For all executive turnovers in our original difference-in-differences sample, we search
each of these cases on Factiva for articles mentioning the names of departing executives
or their successions. We read these articles to determine the reasons for each executive
turnover. Then we manually classify an executive turnover as an endogenous one if we can
identify the following conditions: i) an executive is fired; ii) an executive resigns due to
corporate policy differences; and iii) an executive resigns due to board pressure (Parrino,
1997). For the turnovers which we could not identify any of the above three conditions, we
follow Parrino (1997) and take the turnovers as exogenous ones if the departing executives
are above 60 years old at the time of the turnover. Turnovers in which the outgoing
executive is under age 60 are reviewed further to identify as exogenous if the press reports
the reason for departure as death, poor health, and the acceptance of another position, the
press reports that the executive is retiring but does not announce the retirement within 6
months before the retirement, or the relevant articles convincingly explain the departures as
due to reasons unrelated to the firms’ activities (Parrino, 1997). The remaining turnovers
are taken as endogenous turnovers.
Columns (7)–(12) of Table 5 reports the results of our difference-in-differences tests af-
16We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
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ter dropping the endogenous executive turnovers from our turnover sample. The estimated
coefficients of CFOTransitionj × CFOPostj,T+1 are all negative and statistically signifi-
cant except in column (9). The estimated coefficients of CEOTransitionj×CEOPostj,T+1
remain statistically insignificant. Overall, our main findings are robust to the difference-
in-differences specification.
5. Additional analyses and further discussions
So far, we have documented that firms with female CFOs have less future stock price
crash risk than those with male CFOs, while CEO gender is not related to crash risk. In
this section, we provide analyses and discussions that, in general, are aimed at establishing
channels through which female CFOs curb firm bad news hoarding behavior and answering
the question of whether our results are robust.
5.1. Sub-sample analyses
In this section, we divide our CFO sample into two sub-samples based on the median
of corporate governance quality, product market competition, information asymmetry, and
ex ante firm risk, respectively. Then we conduct sub-sample analyses to investigate whether
the relation between CFO gender and crash risk can be explained by the variations in these
important firm characteristics.17
5.1.1. Corporate governance
First, we examine whether the effect of CFO gender on crash risk is related to firms’
corporate governance quality. Comparing to male CFOs, female CFOs tend to be more
risk averse, less overconfident, and more likely to comply with financial reporting rules.
These behavioral traits may naturally mitigate the agency problems such as managerial
risk taking and bad news hoarding activities. According to agency theory, we expect to
17Untabulated F-test results suggest that the difference of the impact of CFO gender on crash risk
between the two subsamples are statistically significant.
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observe more managerial risk taking and bad news hoarding activities when firms lack
effective governance monitoring mechanisms. For behavioral CFOs to have a material
impact on firm crash risk, corporate governance must be limited in its ability to constrain
them into making rational decisions (Baker and Wurgler, 2012). Therefore, we posit that
the relation between CFO gender and future stock price crash risk is stronger for firms
with worse governance monitoring mechanisms.
We use two proxies for corporate governance quality. The first proxy, EindexT , is
the managerial entrenchment index composed of the six most important anti-takeover pro-
visions in the G-index (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009). When a firm has
more firm-level anti-takeover provisions, it has a higher Eindex but poorer corporate gov-
ernance. The second proxy, DioT , measures a firm’s monitoring institutional ownership,
which is the percentage of shares outstanding held by dedicated and quasi-index institu-
tional investors at the end of the fiscal year. Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors
into three categories: dedicated, quasi-index, and transient. Following Chen et al. (2007),
we combine dedicated and quasi-index institutions together and take them as monitoring
institutional investors.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the relation between CFO gender and crash risk in high
and low Eindex sub-samples. The estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are negative for
both sub-samples. However, the coefficients are only statistically significant in the high
Eindex sub-sample for all three measures of crash risk. Panel B of Table 6 reports the
results of sub-sample analyses for firms with high and low monitoring institutions’ owner-
ship. A higher proportion of monitoring institutional holdings indicates better corporate
governance quality. The estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are negative for both
sub-samples, but only statistically significant for sub-samples with low monitoring institu-
tional ownership. In both Panel A and B, the absolute value of the estimated coefficients of
FemaleCFOT is much greater in the low corporate governance quality sub-samples than
in the corresponding high corporate governance quality sub-samples. Taken as a whole,
our findings indicate that the impact of female CFOs on crash risk is associated with cor-
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porate governance quality. Managerial bad news hoarding activities are more likely to be
observed in firms with less internal and external monitoring mechanisms.
5.1.2. Product market competition
Second, we study whether the empirical association between CFO gender and crash
risk is different for firms in non-competitive and competitive industries. Because firms
operating in a competitive product market have a higher probability of being driven out
of the business, product market competition may mitigate managerial slack and conflict
of interest (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). Giroud and Mueller (2011) show that the benefits
of corporate governance are significantly larger for firms facing lower product market com-
petition. Consistent with this notion, Li (2010) finds that market competition improves
corporate disclosure quality, and in turn reduces information asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders. Kim et al. (2014) also find that the negative relation between CFO op-
tion incentives and crash risk is only statistically significant for firms in low competitive
industries.
We define CompetitionT as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index estimated by firms’ total
sales over the fiscal year within the same industry. A greater CompetitionT is associated
with a lower degree of product market competition. Panel C of Table 6 shows that the
estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are all negative but only statistically significant
in the low product market competition sub-samples. The absolute value of the estimated
coefficients is also greater for the sub-sample of firms in non-competitive industries than for
those in competitive industries. This finding suggests that executive gender interacts with
the corporate governance mechanism and that firms in non-competitive industries benefit
more from female executives than do firms in competitive industries.
5.1.3. Information asymmetry
Third, we examine the impact of a firm’s asymmetric information on the relation
between CFO gender and crash risk. When outside investors are less informed, they have to
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exert more effort and incur a higher cost to monitor firm managers. Therefore, we expect to
observe more bad news hoarding activities for firms facing greater asymmetric information.
According to Lang et al. (2003), financial analyst coverage reduces information asymmetry
between managers and outside investors. Yu (2008) further finds that firms followed by
more financial analysts manage their earnings less.
We use a firm’s financial analyst coverage as the proxy for firm-level information
asymmetry. AnalystT is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of
following analysts who issue earnings forecasts for the firm during the fiscal year. A lower
AnalystT indicates a higher level of information asymmetry. Panel D of Table 6 presents the
relation between CFO gender and crash risk in above- and below-median analyst coverage
sub-samples. The estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are all negative but only statisti-
cally significant in the below-median analyst coverage sub-samples. Across three measures
of crash risk, the absolute value of the estimated coefficients is significantly greater in
the below-median analyst coverage sub-sample than in the above-median analyst coverage
sub-sample. These findings lend further support to our main hypothesis that female CFOs
tend to engage in less bad news hoarding activities.
5.1.4. Firm risk
Last, we investigate whether firm riskiness has an impact on the relation between
CFO gender and crash risk. Gender difference in risk attitudes has been extensively studied
in the earlier psychology and economics literatures. Most studies support the view that
women are relatively more risk averse and less overconfident than men (e.g., Croson and
Gneezy, 2009; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). On the one hand, firms run by female CFOs
may undertake less risky projects than those run by male CFOs in the first place, hence
we naturally observe less activities of hiding risk taking behavior in firms run by female
CFOs. One the other hand, given the same ex ante incentives to hide risk taking, female
CFOs are more likely to choose not to do so. Both possibilities lead to the same prediction
that the negative relation between CFO gender and crash risk is more pronounced for firms
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with higher ex ante incentives to hide risk taking activities.
Empirically, we use firm existing financial leverage, LeverageT , as a proxy for firm
riskiness. Panel E of Table 6 reports the sub-sample analysis of the relation between CFO
gender and crash risk for above- and below-median leverage firms. The estimated coeffi-
cients of FemaleCFOT are negative in both sub-samples, but they are only statistically
significant for above-median leverage firms. The absolute value of the estimated coeffi-
cients is also greater for the sub-sample of firms with high leverage than for those with low
leverage. Our results suggest that the impact of CFO gender on future crash risk is more
concentrated in firms with high risk profiles.
5.2. Managerial characteristics and board gender diversity
One of the key findings in our paper is that CFO gender is more strongly related to
future crash risk than CEO gender. Our study supports the work by Kim et al. (2011a),
who also examine the different roles of CEO and CFO in moderating crash risk. Kim
et al. (2011a) find that CFOs’ pay for performance sensitivity, measured by the sensitiv-
ity of option portfolio value to stock price, is significantly and positively associated with
future crash risk, while the relation between CEOs’ pay for performance sensitivity and
future crash risk is weak. To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by CFOs’
compensation incentives, we directly control for CFOs’ option incentive (CFO Opt IncT )
in Equation (4). Previous crash risk studies usually do not control for CFO managerial
characteristics. A recent work by Andreou et al. (2016) shows that firms with older CEOs
are less likely to experience future stock price crashes. Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012)
also find that manager tenure is negatively related to firm systematic and idiosyncratic
risk. We further add CFO AgeT and CFO TenureT as control variables in Equation (4).
CFO age and tenure may also proxy for CFO work experience and expertise, which may
partly explain the impact of CFO gender on future crash risk. Columns (1)–(3) of Ta-
ble 7 present the regression results of Equation (4) after controlling for CFO Opt IncT ,
CFO AgeT , and CFO TenureT . The estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT remain neg-
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ative and statistically significant across all three measures of crash risk. However, the
coefficients of CFO Opt IncT are all statistically insignificant. It seems that the relation
between CFO pay for performance sensitivity and crash risk is weak if we include CFO
gender into consideration.18 Furthermore, there is no evidence that CFO age and tenure
have a significant effect on future stock price crash risk.
Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that the CEO pay slice may reflect the extent to which
the CEO is able to extracts rents. Therefore, the variation in the CEO pay slice may
help to explain the empirical relationship between CFO characteristics and firm financial
reporting quality. In columns (4)–(6), we control for CEO PaysliceT , the annual com-
pensation of a CEO divided by the sum of top five executives’ annual compensation. The
estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT remain negative and statistically significant across
all three measures of crash risk. The coefficients of CEO PaysliceT are all positive but
only statistically significant in columns (4) and (6).
Previous studies show that board gender diversity affects corporate decisions. Gul
et al. (2011) find that stock prices of firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more firm-
specific information. Levi et al. (2014) use mergers and acquisitions as their empirical
setting and show that boards with female directors can mitigate managerial empire building
activities. Chen et al. (2017) show that female independent directors are more likely to
impose high dividend payouts. Therefore, it is important for us to differentiate the effect of
CFO gender from the effect of board gender diversity on stock price crash risk. We collect
director-level data from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics), which provides director profiles for
S&P 1500 firms including director name, title, gender, and committee membership, etc.
We construct variable Female DirectorT , the ratio of female independent director number
to the board size (Chen et al., 2017), for 10,172 firm-year observations and 1,601 unique
firms in our main sample. The number of firm-year observations with female CFOs on
18Nevertheless, the sample period of Kim et al. (2011a) is 1993–2009 and our sample covers 2006–
2015. Jiang et al. (2010) find that executives’ equity incentives are not positively associated with the
magnitude of accruals during the post-SOX period. Therefore, we remain cautious about over interpreting
and generalizing this result.
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board is only 81 and the number of unique firms with female CFOs on board is only 33,
supporting the view that CFOs do not usually serve as the board of directors at their
own companies.19 Furthermore, we examine whether CFO gender has a significant effect
on crash risk after controlling for board gender diversity. In columns (7)–(9), we include
Female DirectorT as a control variable in Equation (4). The coefficients of FemaleCFOT
remain negative and statistically significant in columns (7) and (8). When the dependent
variable is DuvolT+1, the coefficient of FemaleCFOT is negative with t-statistics being
−1.492. We do not find evidence that female independent directors on board have a
significant effect on crash risk.
Finally, we control for CFO characteristics, CEO pay slice, and board gender diversity
together in columns (10)–(12). Our main results remain robust. In summary, the results
in Table 7 indicate that female CFOs moderate firm future crash risk even after controlling
for a battery of managerial characteristics and board gender diversity.20
5.3. Female CFOs and bad news hoarding
Previous crash risk studies support the view that firm stock price crashes are caused
by bad news hoarding. To establish a channel through which female CFOs mitigate future
stock price crash risk, this section conducts analyses on the relation between female CFOs
and the probability of firm earnings’ restatement.21 One important way that managers
hide bad news is to manipulate firms’ reported earnings. When the bad news accumulates
to a critical level and eventually managers give up, it is likely that firms will restate their
earnings to the fundamental value. Therefore, female CFOs may reduce crash risk by
limiting misreporting and increasing financial statement quality.
We examine whether firms with female CFOs are less likely to restate their earnings.
19According to a 2012 survey study by executive recruitment firm Spencer Stuart, just 19 CFOs of the
Fortune 500 companies sit on their boards, dropping from 37 in 2005
20Due to the data availability, we cannot formally rule out the possibility that our findings are explained
by CFO financial expertise such as previous work experience, education, and certifications.
21Huang and Kisgen (2013) and Faccio et al. (2016) provide the evidence of another channel that firms
with female executives take less risk than those with male executives.
30
Our earnings restatement data is collected from Audit Analytics, which covers only events
when firms correct their misstated financial statements. We further drop all clerical appli-
cation errors and include only accounting rule application failures and financial fraud to
ensure that our restatement sample includes material generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples (GAAP) misapplications and not unintentional reporting errors (e.g., Bens et al.,
2012). We define RestatementT+1 as an indicator variable that equals one if the beginning
date of a misstatement period falls within fiscal year T + 1 and zero otherwise.
Table 8 presents the marginal effects from the probit regression of RestatementT+1
on FemaleCFOT . In column (1), we do not include any control variables. In column
(2), we add control variables SizeT , MtbT , LeverageT , OCFT , LossT , and BigfourT . In
column (3), we further add control variables related to firm managers: CFO Opt IncT ,
CFO AgeT , and CFO TenureT . The marginal effects of female CFOs on the likelihood
of earnings restatements are negative and statistically significant across all three columns.
Using column (3) as an example, a firm run by a female CFO is associated with a 2.0%
decrease in the likelihood of earnings restatements, as compared to a firm run by a male
CFO. Given that the sample mean of the restatement probability is 6.5%, the effect of
female CFOs in reducing the restatement probability is economically significant. Overall,
the results in Table 8 provide evidence that female CFOs reduce crash risk by mitigating
bad news hoarding and improving financial reporting quality channels.
5.4. Overconfidence vs. risk aversion
We argue that firms with female CFOs are less likely to experience future stock price
crashes because female CFOs are less risk averse, less overconfidence, and more compliant
with financial reporting regulations. In the previous section, we have shown that firms
with female CFOs are less likely to restate their earnings, providing a direct evidence that
female CFOs are more compliant with financial reporting regulations. In this section, we
focus on the other two traits and examine whether risk aversion or overconfidence is more
important in affecting crash risk.
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To measure CFO risk aversion, we adopt Delta and V ega of a CFO’s stock op-
tion portfolio. Following Core and Guay’s (2002) one-year approximation method, Delta
(V ega) is defined as the value increase in a CFO’s option portfolio for a 1% increase in the
underlying stock price (stock return volatility). Previous studies suggest that large Delta
discourages managerial risk taking, while large V ega encourages risk taking. To measure
CFO overconfidence, we adopt a CFO stock option proxy following Malmendier and Tate
(2005) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012). Specifically, our measure of overconfidence is based
on CFOs’ revealed beliefs captured by their preference not to exercise deep in-the-money
stock options timely. We exploit information about all outstanding options held by CFOs
that are directly observable starting in 2006 due to requirements from the FAS 123R. We
define an indicator variable, Overconfidence, which is equal to one if a CFO, at least
once during our sample period, holds an option until the year of expiration, even though
the stock option is at least 67% in-the-money entering its final year; and zero otherwise.22
Next, we run the following two regressions:
CFO genderj,T = β0 + β1Deltaj,T + β2Vegaj,T + θi + µT + εj,T (6)
CFO genderj,T = β0 + β1Overfidencej,T + θi + µT + εj,T (7)
where θi are Fama–French 48 industry fixed effects and µT are year fixed effects. The
residual term estimated in Equation (6) represents the variation in CFO gender which
cannot be explained by CFO’s risk aversion. Similarly, the residual term estimated in
Equation (7) represents the variation in CFO gender which cannot be explained by CFO’s
overconfidence. Next, we replace Executive gender j,T in Equation (4) by one of these two
residual terms. We reestimate Equation (4) and report the regression results in Table 9.
22Following Campbell et al. (2011), we compute option moneyness as follows. The realizable value per
option is defined as the total realizable value of all unexercised but exercisable options divided by the
number of exercisable options held by a CFO. The average strike price is estimated as the fiscal year-end
stock price minus the average realizable value per option. We then calculate the average percent moneyness
of the options as the per-option realizable value divided by the estimated average exercise price. Since we
are interested in exercisable options that CFO can exercise, we only focus on vested options held by CFOs.
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In columns (1)–(3), the residual term is estimated in Equation (6) and all of its coefficients
are all negative and statistically significant. After we remove the variation in risk aversion
from CFO gender, the variation in CFO gender which cannot be explained by risk aversion
still has a negative impact on future stock price crash risk. However, the absolute values of
these coefficients are less than the absolute values of FemaleCFOT ’s coefficients reported
in the columns (1)–(3) of Table 2, suggesting that risk aversion does play a certain role in
affecting crash risk. In columns (4)–(6), we find that the coefficients of the residual term
estimated in Equation (7) are statistically insignificant. After we remove the variation in
overconfidence from CFO gender, the variation in CFO gender which cannot be explained
by overconfidence is not related to future stock price crash risk. These results suggest
that CFO overconfidence is an important the channel through which CFO gender affects
crash risk, which is consistent with Kim et al.’s (2016) findings that firms with overconfi-
dent CEOs have higher crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. Furthermore,
comparing the coefficients of ResidualT between columns (1)–(3) and columns (4)–(6), we
find that overconfidence is more important than risk aversion in terms of explaining the
empirical relation between CFO gender and crash risk.
5.5. Powerful CEOs
In our paper, we find that the impact of CFO gender on crash risk is statistically
significant while the impact of CEO gender on crash risk is not. Our result is consistent
with the results of Kim et al. (2011a) that CFO equity incentives are strongly associated
with higher firm crash risk, while the relation between CEO equity incentives and crash
risk is much weaker. Feng et al. (2011) document that CFOs may involved in material
accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs. While we cannot
directly observe the interactions between CEOs and CFOs to explain why CFOs become
involved in bad news hoarding activities, we provide indirect evidence to identify whether
our main finding is due to CFO acquiescing to CEO pressure. To explore the interactive
relationship between CEOs and CFOs, we follow Feng et al. (2011) and classify powerful
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CEOs as those who are both a firm’s CEO and chairman of the board. Untabulated results
suggest that the impact of CFO gender on crash risk is statistically significant for the firms
with non-dual-role CEOs, while the impact of CEO gender on crash risk is not statistically
significant for the firms with dual-role CEOs. Our results support our prediction that
CEOs may overpower the influence of CFOs on crash risk.
5.6. Alternative crash risk measures
In this section, we explore the alternative crash risk definitions in the previous stud-
ies. First, we follow Kim et al. (2011b) and identify crash weeks in fiscal year T for firm
j as those weeks during which the firm-specific weekly return Wj,t is 3.20 standard devia-
tions below the average firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year T . Then we redefine
CrashT+1 as Crash 3.20T+1 using 3.20 as the threshold. Second, we follow Callen and Fang
(2015) and estimate firm-specific weekly returns by adding Fama–French 10 industry re-
turns in Equation (1). Then we redefine NcsckewT+1 and DuvolT+1 as Ncsckew FF10T+1
and Duvol FF10T+1 using the firm-specific weekly returns estimated by the expanded
market and industry index model. Third, we redefine CrashT+1 as Crash 3.20&FF10T+1
using both 3.20 as the threshold and the firm-specific weekly returns estimated by the
expanded market and industry index model. Fourth, we follow Hutton et al. (2009) and
define CountT+1 as the number of firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.09 standard
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year. Finally, we
follow Kim et al. (2011b) and extend our measurement interval of future crash risk into
two- and three-year-ahead forecast windows.23 We use all these alternative crash risk mea-
sures as the dependent variables in Equation (4). Untabulated results suggest that the
estimated coefficients of FemaleCFOT are all negative and statistically significant. Our
results remain robust for these alternative definitions of crash risk.
23If firm managers withhold bad news for extended periods, then the effect of bad news hoarding on
stock price will persist for a longer period of time. Given an average tenure of female CFOs as 4.7 years
in our sample, it is likely that female CFOs may influence crash risk for more than one year in the future.
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5.7. Discussion
In this paper, we argue that female executives’ behavioral traits, such as risk aversion,
lack of self-confidence, and the tendency for compliance, affect their decisions and firm
stock price crash risk. We caution, however, that social norms may be a potential driver
of our results. The expectations by society about what is appropriate for women to do
(Altonji and Blank, 1999; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), may affect not only a woman’s
intention to work, but also her choice of occupations (CEO or CFO). Due to the invisible yet
unavoidable glass ceiling, female firm managers who reach the top echelon of the corporate
hierarchy may be more competent and work harder than their male peers (e.g., Green
et al., 2009; Kumar, 2010). Given the data available to us, we cannot empirically rule
out this competency story as the alternative explanation of our results. However, the
competency concern is mitigated to a certain degree given that previous studies fail to
draw a conclusion that teams with female members perform better than those with male
members (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Furthermore, some firms may have a target for
their executive gender diversity ratios. If these firms do not find enough female executive
candidates in the labor market, then the competence of their female executives would be
actually lower than that of male executives.
Previous stock price crash risk studies have applied an agency theory framework to
explore the firm side explanations of stock price crashes. The rational explanations of
managerial bad news hoarding activities include (but are not limited to) limited investor
protection (Jin and Myers, 2006), opaqueness in financial reports (Hutton et al., 2009),
executive compensation incentive (Kim et al., 2011a), corporate tax avoidance (Kim et al.,
2011b), International Financial Reporting Standards (DeFond et al., 2015), and auditor–
client relationship (Callen and Fang, 2017). These studies assume that managers are
rational and can make managerial decisions accurately based on firm inside information.
The agency conflicts that managers try to benefit themselves at the costs of shareholders
lead to the managerial bad news hoarding activities.
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Our paper suggests that executive gender is an alternative behavioral explanations
of stock price crashes. Among the three behavioral traits related to executive gender, the
tendency for compliance is directly related to the agency conflicts, while risk aversion and
overconfidence are beyond the scope of the rational explanations in the previous crash
risk literature. Baker and Wurgler (2012) describe irrational managerial behaviors in the
behavioral finance theories as those departing from rational expectations and expected
utility maximization of the manager. Risk loving and overconfident managers fall into the
situations where a manager believes that he is actually maximizing firm value but is, in
fact, deviating from the optimal equilibrium (Baker et al., 2007; Baker and Wurgler, 2012).
Both the degree of risk aversion and overconfidence level are naturally related to managerial
risk-taking activities. The documented association between CFO gender and stock price
crash risk, as an explanation based on behavioral corporate finance, complements prior
stock price crash theories.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we focus on the ongoing debate about gender diversity and its impact
on stock returns. We examine whether executive gender has an impact on asset prices
by reducing firm future stock price crash risk. Using a large sample of US public firms
during 2006–2015, we find a negative association between female CFOs and future crash
risk than those with male CFOs, while CEO gender does not contribute to crash risk. Our
main results are robust after controlling for the endogeneity between executive gender and
crash risk. These results are consistent with the view that female CFOs are less aggressive
in making business and finance decisions and are more cautious in the disclosure of firm
information. We further find that the empirical relation between CFO gender and crash
risk is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance, less product market
competition, lower financial analyst coverage, and higher firm leverage. These findings
enrich our understanding of the influence of executive gender on crash risk and shed light
36
on how firm internal governance, external monitoring mechanisms, as well as risk profiles
interact with executive gender to mitigate the agency problem.
We contribute to the literature by examining the implication of executive gender on
firm stock returns, a previously unexplored area. Our findings complement prior studies
that examine the impact of executive gender on corporate decision making activities and
document the different roles of CEOs and CFOs in firm operations. Our findings suggest
that female and male executives make corporate decisions differently, which affects firm
asset returns in a higher moment. Our study also has two important implications for
legislators and regulators. First, it may be beneficial for firms to run by a gender diversified
management team. Second, our evidence that firm CFOs have a substantial impact on firm
crash risk caused by bad news hoarding activities supports the current Sarbanes-Oxley
requirement that a firm’s CEO and CFO need to file individual certifications about the
firm’s financial statements.
Highlights
• Female CFOs curb bad news hoarding and affect stock return distribution.
• Firms with female CFOs experience lower future stock price crash risk.
• The impact of female CEOs on crash risk is not statistically significant.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variable definitions
This table provides variable definitions and corresponding data sources. CRSP refers to
the Centre for Research in Security Prices, ExecuComp refers to Standard and Poor’s
Executive Compensation database, ISS refers to the Institutional Shareholder Services
(formerly RiskMetrics), I/B/E/S refers to the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System,
s34 files refer to the Thomson Reuters 13F Database, and Bushee’s website refers to
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.
Variable Definition Source
CrashT+1 An indicator variable that equals one if a firm experiences
one or more firm-specific weekly returns exceeding 3.09
standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly
returns over the fiscal year and zero otherwise, with 3.09
chosen to generate frequencies of 0.1% in a normal
distribution (Hutton et al., 2009).
CRSP
NcskewT+1 The negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific weekly
returns over the fiscal year (Chen et al., 2001).
CRSP
DuvolT+1 The natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for the
“down-week” sample to the standard deviation of
firm-specific weekly returns for the “up week” sample over
the fiscal year (Chen et al., 2001).
CRSP
FemaleCFOT An indicator variable that equals one if a CFO is female
and zero otherwise.
ExecuComp
FemaleCEOT An indicator variable that equals one if a CEO is female
and zero otherwise.
ExecuComp
DturnT The difference between the average monthly share turnover
over fiscal year T − 1 and the average monthly share
turnover over fiscal year T , where monthly share turnover
is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the
total number of shares outstanding over the month (Kim
et al., 2011a).
CRSP
SigmaT The standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over
the fiscal year (Kim et al., 2011a).
CRSP
ReturnT The mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal
year, times 100 (Kim et al., 2011a).
CRSP
SizeT The natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end
of the fiscal year (Kim et al., 2011a).
Compustat
MtbT The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value
of equity measured at the end of the fiscal year (Kim
et al., 2011a).
Compustat
Continued on next page
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Table A1 - continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
LeverageT The ratio of long-term debt to total assets measured at the
end of the fiscal year (Kim et al., 2011a).
Compustat
RoaT The ratio of income before extraordinary items divided by
lagged total assets (Kim et al., 2011a), measured at the
end of the fiscal year.
Compustat
AccmT The prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of
discretionary accruals, where discretionary accruals are
estimated from the modified Jones’s (1991) model
(Dechow et al., 1995).
Compustat
LitigationriskT An indicator variable that equals one for firms in the
biotechnology (4-digit SIC codes 2833–2836 and
8731–8734), computer (4-digit SIC codes 3570–3577 and
7370–7374), electronics (4-digit SIC codes 3600–3674), and
retail (4-digit SIC codes 5200–5961) industries, and zero
otherwise (Francis et al., 1994).
Compustat
EindexT An entrenchment index composed of the six most
important provisions in the G-index (Bebchuk et al.,
2009).
ISS
AnalystT The natural logarithm of one plus the number of following
analysts who issue earnings forecasts during the fiscal year.
I/B/E/S
CompetitionT The Herfindahl-Hirschman index estimated by firms’ total
sales over the fiscal year within the same industry.
Compustat
DioT The percentage of shares outstanding held by dedicated
and quasi-index institutional investors at the end of the
fiscal year (Bushee, 1998).
s34 files &
Bushee’s website
CFO Opt IncT The incentive ratio for CFO option holdings, which is
calculated as Onepct Opt/(Onepct Opt+Salary+Bonus).
The variable Onepct Opt is the dollar change in the value
of CFO option holdings resulting from a 1% increase in the
firm’s stock price (Kim et al., 2011a).
ExecuComp
CFO AgeT The CFO age. ExecuComp
CFO TenureT The number of years in a CFO post with a particular firm. ExecuComp
CFOTransition An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is a
male-to-female CFO transaction firm and zero if a firm is a
male-to-male CFO transaction firm (Huang and Kisgen,
2013).
ExecuComp
CFOPostT+1 An indicator variable that equals one if firm–years are
after the CFO transition and zero otherwise (Huang and
Kisgen, 2013).
ExecuComp
CEO PaysliceT The ratio of a CEO’s annual compensation to the sum of
top five executives’ annual compensation.
ExecuComp
Female DirectorT The ratio of female independent director number to the
board size (Chen et al., 2017).
ISS
Continued on next page
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Table A1 - continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
RestatementT+1 An indicator variable that equals one if a firm restates its
earnings and zero otherwise.
Audit Analytics
OCFT The operating cash flow scaled by total assets. Compustat
LossT An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s earnings
are negative and zero otherwise.
Compustat
BigfourT An indicator variable that equals one if a firm is audited
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Table 1. Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of stock price crash risk variables, executive gender
variables, and the other variables used in our empirical tests. Our main sample consists
of 12, 745 firm–year observations covered by ExecuComp over the period 2006–2015 with
available CFO gender and other variable information. The number of observations, mean,
standard deviation, 5th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and 95th per-
centile are reported from left to right, in sequence for each variable. Detailed definitions
of all variables are described in Appendix A.
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. p5 p25 Median p75 p95
Crash risk measures
CrashT+1 12,745 0.254 0.435 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
NcskewT+1 12,745 0.098 0.866 -1.174 -0.375 0.051 0.511 1.555
DuvolT+1 12,745 0.004 0.380 -0.596 -0.247 -0.006 0.245 0.643
CEO & CFO gender variables
FemaleCEOT 13,018 0.034 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FemaleCFOT 12,745 0.089 0.284 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Other variables
DturnT 12,745 0.001 0.101 -0.130 -0.036 0.000 0.034 0.134
NcskewT 12,745 0.095 0.832 -1.132 -0.366 0.040 0.483 1.518
SigmaT 12,745 0.040 0.020 0.017 0.026 0.036 0.049 0.077
ReturnT 12,745 -0.097 0.128 -0.290 -0.115 -0.062 -0.032 -0.014
SizeT 12,745 7.727 1.508 5.437 6.621 7.603 8.741 10.410
MtbT 12,745 2.844 2.333 0.834 1.437 2.174 3.419 7.140
LeverageT 12,745 0.203 0.163 0.000 0.048 0.192 0.318 0.496
RoaT 12,745 0.057 0.075 -0.063 0.024 0.054 0.095 0.180
AccmT 12,745 0.146 0.215 0.029 0.064 0.108 0.181 0.376
LitigationriskT 12,745 0.283 0.451 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
EindexT 9,776 2.726 1.251 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000
AnalystT 12,745 1.964 0.974 0.000 1.386 2.197 2.708 3.258
DioT 12,745 0.523 0.234 0.000 0.442 0.574 0.675 0.814
CompetitionT 12,745 0.120 0.103 1.000 0.066 0.093 0.137 0.282
CFO Opt IncT 12,745 0.072 0.096 1.000 0.006 0.039 0.100 0.261
CFO AgeT 12,015 51.021 6.584 40 46 51 56 62
CFO TenureT 12,015 4.723 3.426 1 2 4 7 11
CEO PaysliceT 12,671 0.396 0.115 0.203 0.332 0.401 0.461 0.574
Female DirectorT 10,172 0.122 0.098 0 0 0.111 0.200 0.300
RestatementT+1 12,745 0.065 0.247 0 0 0 0 1
OCFT 12,745 0.099 0.075 0 0.056 0.096 0.140 0.224
LossT 12,745 0.131 0.338 0 0 0 0 1


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Executive gender and crash risk: Propensity score matching estimators
Panel A. Pre-match propensity score regressions and post-match diagnostic regres-
sions. This panel reports the parameter estimates from the probit model used to estimate the
propensity scores. The sample covers firm–year observations with non-missing values for all vari-
ables during 2006–2015. The dependent variables are CFO gender indicators, FemaleCFOT , in
columns (1)–(2), and CEO gender indicators, FemaleCEOT , in columns (3)–(4). The indepen-
dent variables are all the firm characteristics included in our panel regression analyses. We use
one-to-one match and require that the difference between the propensity score of the firm run
by a female executive and its matching peer does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. Columns
(1) and (3) report the pre-match propensity score regressions. Columns (2) and (4) report the
post-match diagnostic regressions. The coefficients of the Fama–French 48 industry and year
fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. All variables are defined in
Appendix A. The z-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm
and year (Petersen, 2009). ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
CFO sample CEO sample
Pre-match Post-match Pre-match Post-match
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables FemaleCFOT FemaleCFOT FemaleCEOT FemaleCEOT
DturnT -0.106 0.011 -0.251 -0.281
(-0.656) (0.038) (-1.221) (-0.446)
NcskewT -0.031 -0.005 0.032 -0.009
(-1.619) (-0.144) (1.130) (-0.181)
SigmaT 3.453 -0.792 4.928 -6.199
(1.613) (-0.171) (1.285) (-0.685)
ReturnT 0.115 0.027 0.800 -0.707
(0.414) (0.043) (1.377) (-0.477)
SizeT 0.048*** -0.011 -0.018 -0.001
(3.311) (-0.461) (-0.875) (-0.019)
MtbT -0.026*** 0.014 0.027*** -0.014
(-2.957) (0.844) (2.777) (-0.898)
LeverageT -0.517*** 0.345 -0.177 0.038
(-4.437) (1.629) (-1.158) (0.111)
RoaT 0.601** 0.427 -0.770** -0.190
(2.343) (0.913) (-2.340) (-0.258)
AccmT -0.610*** -0.308 -0.373* 0.502
(-3.966) (-0.998) (-1.690) (1.058)
LitigationriskT 0.122* -0.043 -0.172* -0.107
(1.649) (-0.301) (-1.793) (-0.484)
Intercept -1.607*** 0.296 -1.703*** 0.033
(-7.821) (0.764) (-7.086) (0.072)
Observations 12,504 2,240 11,340 872
Pseudo R2 0.037 0.010 0.095 0.017
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Executive gender and crash risk: High-dimensional fixed effects
This table reports the high-dimensional fixed effects model estimation results of the impact
of female executives on future stock price crash risk. Columns (1)–(3) report the analyses in
the CFO sample and columns (4)–(6) report the analyses in the CEO sample. In columns
(1) and (4), we control for the firm and year fixed effects. In columns (2)–(3) and (5)–(6),
we control for the firm and interacted industry-year fixed effects. The coefficients of the
Fama–French 48 industry and year fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective
columns. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The z-values and t-values reported in
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
CFO sample CEO sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables CrashT+1NcskewT+1DuvolT+1CrashT+1NcskewT+1DuvolT+1
FemaleCFOT -0.302** -0.120** -0.050**
(-2.158) (-2.437) (-2.317)
FemaleCEOT -0.160 -0.023 0.009
(-0.714) (-0.285) (0.257)
DturnT 0.104 0.089 0.032 0.515** 0.179** 0.064*
(0.454) (1.027) (0.856) (2.211) (2.067) (1.694)
NcskewT -0.176*** -0.095*** -0.042*** -0.148*** -0.088*** -0.039***
(-6.549) (-9.315) (-9.520) (-5.552) (-8.746) (-8.950)
SigmaT 18.342*** 4.521*** 1.410** -3.789 0.392 0.082
(3.567) (2.922) (2.087) (-0.820) (0.240) (0.115)
ReturnT 1.628** 0.291 0.058 0.099 0.102 0.009
(2.207) (1.590) (0.724) (0.160) (0.510) (0.104)
SizeT 0.720*** 0.402*** 0.200*** 0.560*** 0.374*** 0.190***
(9.588) (14.790) (16.831) (7.713) (14.104) (16.413)
MtbT -0.052** -0.013* -0.007** -0.035* -0.015** -0.008***
(-2.563) (-1.811) (-2.351) (-1.874) (-2.142) (-2.645)
LeverageT 0.399 0.068 0.013 0.369 0.102 0.025
(1.227) (0.569) (0.243) (1.169) (0.877) (0.494)
RoaT 0.260 0.027 0.013 0.034 0.045 0.021
(0.571) (0.160) (0.178) (0.077) (0.274) (0.294)
AccmT 0.143 0.085 0.044 0.320 0.137* 0.057*
(0.746) (1.150) (1.362) (1.554) (1.886) (1.801)
Observations 10,878 12,594 12,594 11,151 12,864 12,864
Pseudo/Adjusted-R2 0.027 0.068 0.079 0.023 0.067 0.078
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6. Differential impact of CFO gender on crash risk: Sub-sample analyses
This table reports the cross-sectional relation between CFO gender, governance monitoring
mechanisms, and future stock price crash risk. The sample covers firm–year observations
with non-missing values for all variables during 2006–2015. In Panel A–E, we divide our
main sample into two sub-samples based on the medians of EindexT , DioT , CompetitionT ,
AnalystT , and LeverageT , respectively. The high (low) sub-samples include firm–year
observations with above(below)-median corresponding variables. We use logit regressions
in columns (1) and (2), and OLS regressions in columns (3)–(6). The coefficients of all the
control variables as in Table 2, Fama–French 48 industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects
are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. All variables are defined in Appendix
A. The z-values and t-values reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered
by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
CrashT+1 NcskewT+1 DuvolT+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables High Low High Low High Low
Panel A. EindexT : Managerial entrenchment
FemaleCFOT -0.333** -0.087 -0.105** -0.038 -0.043* -0.010
(-2.210) (-0.880) (-1.986) (-1.032) (-1.869) (-0.646)
Observations 3,532 6,221 3,546 6,230 3,546 6,230
Pseudo/Adjusted-R2 0.028 0.031 0.011 0.019 0.014 0.020
Panel B. DioT : Monitoring institutional ownership
FemaleCFOT -0.091 -0.218* -0.017 -0.092** 0.000 -0.046***
(-0.894) (-1.945) (-0.438) (-2.390) (0.024) (-2.742)
Observations 6,364 6,351 6,370 6,375 6,370 6,375
Pseudo/Adjusted-R2 0.026 0.032 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.016
Panel C. CompetitionT : Product market competition
FemaleCFOT -0.123 -0.187* 0.003 -0.113*** -0.000 -0.045***
(-1.153) (-1.781) (0.074) (-3.017) (-0.003) (-2.696)
Observations 6,347 6,369 6,376 6,369 6,376 6,369
Pseudo/Adjusted-R2 0.028 0.032 0.018 0.011 0.021 0.014
Panel D. AnalystT : Analyst coverage
FemaleCFOT -0.103 -0.200* -0.038 -0.075** -0.015 -0.030*
(-0.974) (-1.847) (-0.992) (-1.983) (-0.885) (-1.793)
Observations 6,110 6,615 6,110 6,635 6,110 6,635
Pseudo/Adjusted-R2 0.032 0.032 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.018
Panel E. LeverageT : Financial leverage
FemaleCFOT -0.263** -0.109 -0.098** -0.032 -0.040** -0.012
(-2.306) (-1.092) (-2.566) (-0.856) (-2.329) (-0.708)
Observations 6,241 6,479 6,256 6,489 6,256 6,489












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8. CFO gender and earnings restatement
This table reports the probit regression results (marginal effect reported) of the impact
of female CFOs on firms’ future earnings restatement probabilities. The sample covers
firm–year observations with non-missing values for all variables during 2006–2015. The
dependent variable is RestatementT+1, an indicator variable equal to one if a firm restates
its earnings in the fiscal year T + 1. The independent variable of interest is FemaleCFOT ,
a CFO gender indicator variable. The coefficients of the Fama–French 48 industry and year
fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. The z-values and t-values reported in parentheses are based on standard
errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables RestatementT+1 RestatementT+1 RestatementT+1




















Observations 12,745 12,666 11,941
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.035 0.034
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
57
Table 9. Risk aversion vs. overconfidence
This table examines whether the empirical relation between CFO gender and future stock
price crash risk can be explained by CFO risk aversion or overconfidence. The sample covers
firm–year observations with non-missing values for all variables during 2006–2015. The
dependent variables are three measures of stock price crash risk: CrashT+1, NcskewT+1,
and DuvolT+1. The independent variables of interests are the residual terms estimated in
Equation (6) and (7). We use logit regressions in columns (1) and (4), and OLS regressions
in columns (2)–(3) and (5)–(6). The coefficients of the Fama–French 48 industry and year
fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. All variables are defined
in Appendix A. The z-values and t-values reported in parentheses are based on standard
errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Risk aversion (Eq (6)) Overconfidence (Eq (7))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables CrashT+1NcskewT+1DuvolT+1CrashT+1NcskewT+1DuvolT+1
ResidualT -0.044** -0.016** -0.006* -0.017 -0.002 -0.003
(-2.062) (-2.091) (-1.918) (-0.546) (-0.171) (-0.503)
DturnT 0.005 0.025 0.007 -0.088 -0.017 -0.011
(0.020) (0.336) (0.211) (-0.331) (-0.199) (-0.277)
NcskewT 0.025 0.024** 0.009* 0.038 0.012 0.003
(0.980) (2.257) (1.910) (1.291) (0.942) (0.552)
SigmaT 25.204*** 5.381*** 1.645*** 24.190*** 5.420*** 1.691***
(5.437) (3.979) (2.945) (4.918) (3.669) (2.733)
ReturnT 2.790*** 0.515*** 0.178** 2.602*** 0.487** 0.173**
(3.551) (2.754) (2.332) (3.248) (2.571) (2.193)
SizeT 0.061*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.072*** 0.026*** 0.013***
(3.325) (3.157) (3.703) (3.440) (3.294) (3.689)
MtbT -0.015 -0.002 -0.000 -0.020* -0.001 0.001
(-1.423) (-0.524) (-0.201) (-1.650) (-0.159) (0.299)
LeverageT -0.024 -0.058 -0.049** -0.148 -0.100 -0.067**
(-0.159) (-1.041) (-1.985) (-0.851) (-1.530) (-2.324)
RoaT 1.502*** 0.680*** 0.320*** 1.784*** 0.716*** 0.333***
(4.685) (5.546) (5.870) (4.802) (5.012) (5.263)
AccmT 0.127 0.069* 0.033** 0.155* 0.090** 0.040***
(1.450) (1.756) (2.167) (1.840) (2.348) (2.632)
LitigationriskT -0.053 -0.050 -0.017 0.013 -0.017 -0.006
(-0.575) (-1.236) (-0.997) (0.117) (-0.349) (-0.309)
Intercept -2.517*** -0.351*** -0.168*** -2.462*** -0.364*** -0.170***
(-9.658) (-3.867) (-4.229) (-8.289) (-3.443) (-3.709)
Observations 12,503 12,503 12,503 9,297 9,297 9,297
Pseudo/Adjusted-R2 0.015 0.024 0.012 0.018 0.026 0.015
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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